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 WHAT DEFAULT RULES TEACH US ABOUT CORPORATIONS; 
WHAT UNDERSTANDING CORPORATIONS TEACHES US 
ABOUT DEFAULT RULES 
TAMAR FRANKEL* 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article addresses corporate law’s default rules, which allow 
corporations to waive their directors’ liability for damages based on a 
breach of their fiduciary duty of care. Most large publicly held corpo-
rations have adopted such a waiver in their articles of association. 
This Article suggests that courts should limit the range of the waivers 
to the circumstances that existed when the voters voted and to the in-
formation they received before they voted. This Article distinguishes 
between public contracts (legislation) and private contracts (commer-
cial transactions) and the default rules that apply to each. The Article 
shows that courts view corporations and corporate articles as public 
contracts, but unlike default rules applicable to some public contracts, 
courts do not limit the scope of the waivers to the information that the 
voting shareholders received before they voted for the waivers. This 
Article suggests that courts should. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 This Article addresses one fiduciary duty: the corporate directors’ 
duty of care. This duty was greatly reduced by state legislation dur-
ing the 1980s which significantly limited the damage remedies 
against directors that violated the duty of care. I call this issue 
waiver. Many jurisdictions offered waiver as a default rule, which the 
shareholders of the corporations could adopt in their articles of asso-
ciation. This Article addresses the following questions: First, what 
can we learn about the nature of corporations from the default rules 
that courts have developed with respect to waivers? And second, in 
light of the nature of the corporations as reflected in judicial rules, 
how could courts improve the gap-filling default rules that they ap-
plied to waivers?  
 I chose to focus on the waiver, in part, because of the recent dis-
coveries of corporate misdeeds. In many such corporations the direc-
tors failed to inquire about signs of problems. In other corporations 
the directors opened the door to unethical and legal violations and 
failed to strictly supervise the managers’ actions thereafter.1 Often, 
the chief executive officers (CEOs) of these corporations selected the 
candidates for their boards and viewed the directors’ main function 
as advisory. Generally, advice and supervision do not match well. 
Advice assumes that the CEO can take the advice or leave it. Super-
vision leaves the final decision to the board and allows the board to 
direct and overrule the CEO’s choice. In the 1990s, these boards took 
the advisory role more seriously than the supervisory role, perhaps to 
the corporation’s detriment.2 It is quite possible that wrongdoings in 
publicly held corporations have persisted to this very day. This can 
be demonstrated by the continuous restatement of the corporations’ 
financial statements.  
 This is an important issue because large corporations affect the 
nation’s economy and financial system. Some have become cross-
border private governments. External police cannot reach far into 
these mammoth organizations, and internal policing by the boards 
has been weak. To be sure, the reach of the directors’ control is lim-
ited. Yet, they can have some monitoring and supervisory impact. 
For example, if management reported a forty percent loss, and a 
month later, management showed the board a loss of twenty percent, 
and a few weeks later the losses disappeared and gains began to ap-
pear, an attentive board could probe and request an explanation. The 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 
2003); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 
2003).  
 2. See TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A 
CROSSROAD 21 (2006). 
2006]               DEFAULT RULES AND CORPORATIONS 699 
 
directors might then find that the amazing growth of profit was due 
to a change in accounting. Had the board been delighted with the 
sharp and magical change of fortune and not sought explanation and 
evidence of the reasons, it would not have met its duty of care.  
 Regardless of whether the directors were sleeping at the helm or 
rejoicing in the corporations’ performance without question, the di-
rectors of large corporations have been shielded by waivers. The 
story of these waivers and their inception is well known. In the 1985 
case Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held that 
the directors did not pay sufficient attention and did not adequately 
study the proposed purchase of the corporation.3 In fact, the directors 
approved a contract unseen.4 Therefore, the court held that the direc-
tors did not meet their duty of care.5 One could speculate as to 
whether the court did in fact change its interpretation of the direc-
tors’ duty of care or whether the court’s motives were not to tighten 
the directors’ duty of care in general, but only with respect to merg-
ers and acquisitions of their corporations.6 When the decision was 
announced, however, it was deemed to signal a heightened judicial 
scrutiny of directors’ supervision and duty of care. Corporate man-
agement was alarmed and the premiums on directors’ and officers’ 
insurance rose.  
 The Delaware legislature responded to management’s concerns by 
amending corporate law. Rather than reducing the level of the 
breach of duty of care or the remedies for such a breach, Delaware 
converted the rule concerning this duty into a default rule. It allowed 
corporations to limit the damages that directors would pay for breach 
of their duty of care.7 Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani 
noted that “the path taken by Delaware and those other states was 
the desirable one. Had the lenient arrangement been set as default, 
shareholders might well have been unable to amend the charter to 
opt out of it, even if it turned out to be the arrangement they disfa-
vored.”8 Thus, it was better for the law to maintain the higher stan-
dard and stricter remedies and offer the corporations an opportunity 
to reduce directors’ damages. Corporate directors, who hold the key 
to amending the corporate articles, would be interested in a waiver 
                                                                                                                      
 3. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, 65 Del. Laws 544 (1988), as rec-
ognized in Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001).    
 4. Id. at 869.  
 5. Id. at 873-78. 
 6. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW 
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 513 (2003) (“In hindsight, however, Smith has come to seem 
much more like a precursor of the great Delaware takeover cases of the mid-1980s, and es-
pecially of Revlon.”). 
 7. Act of June 18, 1986, 65 Del. Laws 544 (1986). 
 8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evo-
lution, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 489, 493 (2002). 
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and would seek the shareholders’ approval for it. Most states fol-
lowed Delaware’s lead and adopted similar legislation.9 Some states 
reduced the directors’ liabilities subject to the shareholders’ vote for 
“opting out” or directly provided a partial waiver of the directors’ li-
abilities.10  
 This Article is organized as follows: Part II distinguishes between 
two kinds of default rules. One kind is a statutory default rule that 
permits corporate shareholders to provide their directors with a 
                                                                                                                      
 9. See ALA. CODE § 10-2B-2.02(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 first special 
Sess.); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210(1)(N) (LEXIS through 2005 legislation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 10-202(B)(1) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective Mar. 29, 2006); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 4-27-202(B)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2005 regular Sess.); CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 204(a)(10) (West, Westlaw through ch. 17 of 2006 regular Sess. urgency legislation); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-108-402 (West, Westlaw through ch. 8 of 2006 second regular Sess.); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-636(b)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Supp.); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(4) (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 special Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 414-32(b)(4) (Michie, LEXIS through 2005 legislation); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-202(2)(d) 
(LEXIS through 2005 legislation); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.10(b)(3) (West, Westlaw 
through P.A. 94-727 of 2006 regular Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.202(2)(d) (West, West-
law through 2005 first regular Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) (West, Westlaw 
through 2004 regular Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.2-020(2)(d) (West, Westlaw 
through end of 2005 regular Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(C)(4) (West, Westlaw 
through all 2005 regular and first extraordinary Sess. acts); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-B, 
§ 202(2)(D) (West, Westlaw through 2006 second regular Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & 
ASS’NS § 2-405.2 (West, Westlaw through ch. 18 of 2006 regular Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1½) (West, Westlaw through ch. 57 of 2006 second annual Sess.); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1209(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2006, No. 1-98); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(4) (West, Westlaw through ch. 176 of 2006 regular Sess. 
laws); MISS. CODE ANN.  § 79-4-2.02(b)(4) (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 fifth ex-
traordinary Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.055(2)(3) (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 
first extraordinary Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-216(2)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2005 
regular Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-2018(2)(d) (LEXIS through 2005 first Sess.); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292:2(V-a) (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 regular Sess.); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West, Westlaw through ch. 3 of 2006 Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-
12-2(E) (West, Westlaw through Apr. 1, 2006 second regular Sess.); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 
402(b) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2005 legislation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) 
(West, Westlaw through 2005 regular Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(5) (LEXIS 
through 2005 Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1006(B)(7) (West, Westlaw through ch. 15 
of 2006 second regular Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.047(2)(d) (West, Westlaw through 
end of 2003 regular Sess.); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1713 (West, Westlaw through act 
2005-96); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-202(b)(3) (LEXIS through the Jan. 2005 Sess.); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 33-2-102(e) (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 regular Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
48-12-102(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 first regular Sess.); TEX. CORPS. & 
ASS’NS CODE ANN. 7.06(b) (Vernon, Westlaw through end of 2005 second called Sess.); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-7-3.1 (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 second special Sess.); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 2.02(b)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2005 first Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 
13.1-692.1(A) (West, Westlaw through end of 2005 regular Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
23B.08.320 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective Mar. 15, 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 31D-2-202 (LEXIS through 2006 regular Sess., H.B. 4037); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 180.0828 
(West, Westlaw through 2005 Act 101); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-202(b)(iv) (West, Westlaw 
through 2005 regular Sess.). 
 10. FLA. STAT. § 607.0831 (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 public laws approved and effective Mar. 15, 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1701.59 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 12, 2006); 2 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, 
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 16.03, at 16-4 to 16-16 (7th ed. 2005). 
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waiver. The other consists of the gap-filling rules that courts use in 
interpreting the statutory default rules and includes the interpreta-
tion of the corporate articles that contain waivers. To avoid confu-
sion, I call the statutory default rules “permissive default rules.” I 
call the gap-filling rules “gap-filling rules” or “gap-fillers.”  
 Default rules send signals. To fashion rules in any situation, 
courts must first define the relationships among the parties. Underly-
ing all default rules are assumptions about the nature and terms of 
the relationships that the rules address. Gap-fillers for the terms of 
family relations, for example, are quite different from gap-fillers for 
the terms of business relations. Reneging on a promise to marry is 
interpreted differently from reneging on a business deal. That is why 
before the rules can be fashioned and applied, the courts must be 
clear about the nature of the relationships to which they apply.   
 Part III addresses the question of whether corporations present 
private contracts or public contracts (for example, legislation) among 
the parties. For the past thirty years, the corporate form of organiza-
tion and the relationships between the shareholders, the directors 
and the officers of a corporation were characterized as an “aggrega-
tion of crisscrossing contracts.”11 The concept and the name were im-
ported from the discipline of economics.12 Changes in the duty of 
care were cast as the shareholders’ contractual consents to an 
amendment of the corporate articles. This Part examines the differ-
ences between private and public contracts to discover the category 
to which corporations belong.   
 Part IV demonstrates that courts treat corporations as public con-
tracts and then shows the consequences of such a treatment. Finally, 
in Part V, I argue that the treatment of default rules in the context of 
waiver is not optimal and that courts should limit the scope of waiv-
ers to the relevant information the voters received before they voted 
for the waivers. 
                                                                                                                      
 11. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 15-17 (1991) (stating that the “corporate venture” is made up of contracts, 
including agreements in the articles of incorporation and agreements with employees, sup-
pliers, and contractors); see also HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 18 
(1996) (describing the firm as “a nexus of contracts,” by which he means that the “firm is in 
essence the common signatory of a group of contracts” among various factors of produc-
tion). This model’s origins fairly can be traced to Nobel Prize Laureate Ronald Coase’s fa-
mous article on the nature of the firm. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 
386 (1937). As no less an authority than former Delaware Chancellor William Allen has 
acknowledged, contractarianism is now the “dominant legal academic view.” William T. Al-
len, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 
(1993). 
 12. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Ap-
praisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 415-17 (1989). 
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II.   THE TWO KINDS OF DEFAULT RULES: GAP-FILLERS AND 
PERMISSIVE STATUTORY RULES 
 This Article deals with two kinds of default rules. One kind of de-
fault rule is a rule from which the parties are allowed to “contract 
out.” The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and corporate laws of-
fer default rules of this sort.13 These rules are binding on the parties 
unless the parties expressly agree on different terms in their rela-
tionships. This is the type of default rule that dictates the remedies 
applicable upon a director’s violation of his or her duty of care. Simi-
larly, the U.S. Constitution offers default rules for legislation, main-
taining the rules so long as Congress does not provide otherwise.14 
These are “permissive default rules.”  
 The second type of default rule is a rule used to fill gaps in the 
parties’ agreements, when their text is silent about a particular 
situation that has arisen. As H.L.A. Hart recognized, “our relative 
ignorance of fact” and “our relative indeterminacy of aim” require 
what I call “gap-filling rules.”15 No text is truly unambiguous. The 
gap-filling rules enter the stage after the parties have established the 
terms of their agreements and are sometimes referred to as “implied-
in-law.”16  
 Both permissive default rules and gap-fillers involve actions by 
the parties to the contract. However, in the case of permissive default 
rules, the parties react to a rule promulgated by an authority and ei-
ther tacitly accept or “correct” the rule. In the case of gap-filling 
rules, the authority reacts after the parties have established the 
terms of the relationship. In such a case, a third party—usually the 
                                                                                                                      
 13. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305 (2005) (price); id. § 2-307 (single delivery); id. § 2-308 
(place for delivery); id. § 2-309 (time for shipment or delivery); id. § 2-310 (time for pay-
ment); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223 (2005) (providing procedure for filling vacancies and 
newly created directorships “[u]nless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation 
or bylaws”).  One could add a third type of default rule in which the parties are required by 
an authority to fill in blanks on certain subjects, such as the requirements in corporate law 
to establish a financial structure and main office address. This Article does not deal with 
this kind of default rule.  
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.”).  
 15. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125 (1961). 
 16. Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 
78 VA. L. REV. 821, 822-23 (1992) (“That this is the prevailing wisdom of contract theory is 
evidenced by the fact that scholars as disparate as Ian Macneil, Subha Narasimhan, and 
Charles Fried adhere to it. Recently, however, in an almost imperceptible shift, the rheto-
ric of gap-filling has been increasingly supplanted by a new and powerful heuristic device: 
the concept of default rules. This concept has been employed by an ideologically diverse 
group of contract theorists including Ayres and Gertner, Goetz and Scott, Coleman, 
Heckathorn, and Maser, Haddock, Macey, and McChesney, . . . and Douglas Baird, David 
Charny, Richard Craswell, Richard Epstein, Clayton Gillette, and Jason Johnston.” (foot-
notes omitted)).  
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judiciary—uses gap-filling rules to interpret the terms of the parties’ 
relationship.  
III.   THE NATURE OF CORPORATIONS: PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC 
CONTRACTS  
 In a movement that started about thirty years ago, lawyers began 
to refer to the relationships between the shareholders, the directors 
and the officers of a corporation as a “contract.”17 The name and the 
concept were imported from the discipline of economics.18 Changes in 
the management’s duty of care were therefore cast as the sharehold-
ers’ contractual consents to an amendment of the corporate articles.  
 The idea of a contract was not born in modern economics. It ex-
isted in philosophy and the social sciences and carried different 
meanings in the works of Hobbes, Kant, Locke, and Rousseau.19 Con-
tract, however, is a legal category as well, and in the law it has a 
specific meaning and applicable rules. Applying the law of private 
contract to a relationship among the corporate shareholders, direc-
tors and officers simplifies, on the one hand, but distorts, on the 
other hand. It provides just one familiar model of relationship, which 
makes it easier to apply to all situations. It distorts because the 
model does not fit all relationships and brings about inappropriate 
results. I argue here that corporations are not treated, and should 
not be treated, as private contracts. Rather, the rules that apply to 
them are the rules that govern public contracts, such as the rules 
that are applied to legislation.  
 What are the differences between public contracts and private 
contracts? After all, both types are relationships among at least two 
parties (with few exceptions). Both are voluntary relationships. Both 
share the concepts of accord, harmony, and a notion of a common pat-
tern of behavior among willing parties. Both share an idea of a com-
mitment and binding reciprocal promises. Both are governed by rules 
of entry into and exit from the relationship. Both impact third parties 
that did not participate in the contract. And both provide some flexi-
bility for changing the governing terms of the relationship. Therefore, 
it seems that we should apply the same gap-filling interpretative 
rules to both private and public contracts.  
 And yet, fundamental differences between public and private con-
tracts appear in each feature that they share. These differences also 
highlight the status of corporations as public contracts. With few ex-
ceptions, public contracts are not personal. Parties enter the rela-
                                                                                                                      
 17. See supra notes 11-12. 
 18. See Bratton, supra note 12. 
 19. Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract 
Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 847 (1985). 
704  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:697 
 
tionships by qualification rather than upon the other parties’ con-
sent. In contrast, private contracts are personal and entering parties 
must be accepted by all other parties. The form of the parties’ agree-
ment differs. Public contracts are based on consensus; private con-
tracts are based on consent. The amendment of their terms follows 
these different modes of agreement as well. Generally, public con-
tracts have more impact on third parties than private contracts. Fur-
ther, most public contracts are negotiated and designed by the repre-
sentatives of the parties rather than the parties themselves. These 
representatives have a great deal of control over the matters they 
manage. In fact, both corporate directors, who provide the sharehold-
ers with the text on which they will vote, and political representa-
tives, who establish the terms of the public contracts, usually, with-
out soliciting the voters’ direct approval of the text, need to muster a 
consensus of the voters at one point but are not subject to the ap-
proval of each and every one of the voters. These representatives are 
expected to commit to the enterprise rather than to the particular 
voters who chose them. In contrast, most private contracts are nego-
tiated by the parties themselves. If the parties use personal represen-
tatives, such representatives are subject to the control of the parties 
that chose them.  
 Approval of public contracts can involve a vote for specific provi-
sions, such as the waiver in the corporate articles, especially if 
shareholders will forgo the right to claim damages from the directors 
who fail in their duty of care. A comparison with the situation of un-
ion members, however, is instructive. Union members have elected 
representatives that negotiate with management on the union’s be-
half. There is no legal requirement for union members to vote on the 
contracts that their representatives have concluded,20 although ratifi-
cation of contracts may be required in the union’s constitutions or 
under certain other conditions.21 The representatives of the union are 
treated as agents.22 However, the union’s public contract is not frozen 
on the date of signature. Rather, it is subject to ongoing, continuous 
adjustments by negotiations or arbitration among the union repre-
sentatives and the management. Thus, if the parties did not contem-
                                                                                                                      
 20. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2000) (“Any labor organization which represents employees in 
an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activi-
ties affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents.”);  
id. § 185(e) (“For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting 
as an ‘agent’ of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the 
question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently 
ratified shall not be controlling.”); see also 20 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 55:18, at 71 (4th ed. 2001).    
 21. 20 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 20, at 70-71.  
 22. See, e.g., Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., 799 F.2d 
1098, 1112 (6th Cir. 1986).  
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plate new events, the door is open for either party to demand recon-
sideration of the terms of the relationship. Therefore, the parties re-
main in a continuous mode of renegotiation.  
 Corporate relationships typically fit a public, not private, contrac-
tual model. Shareholders and managers enter the relationships with-
out the consent of the other parties to the corporate relationships, but 
by qualifying for entry. Directors must make their decisions for the 
good of the corporation and not in the interests or by the dictates of 
the shareholders that voted for them. Shareholders’ decisions, includ-
ing approval of waivers, are reached by consensus and not by con-
sent, and directors both initiate the votes and write the text.  
A.   The Personal Nature of Private Contracts as Compared to Public 
Contracts 
 A fundamental feature of a private contract is that it is a personal 
relationship.23 The contract involves specified, known, and identified 
parties. These parties need not share the same characteristics or de-
sires, although they share a desire to enter into the relationship for 
the sake of the ultimate result that they believe benefits them. Each 
party is expected to know and choose the party with whom it deals. 
At the foundation of the private contract is an assumption that each 
party will not deal with other parties that it did not choose. To be 
sure, there are transactions in which the parties do not know each 
other, such as trading in the securities markets. However, in such 
cases, the parties know the intermediary broker, dealer, or under-
writer, who represents both parties.   
 This has a variety of consequences. The number of parties to a 
private contract is relatively limited. The limitation may depend on 
the reasonable burden that people can bear in gaining information 
about the other parties, with whom they might wish to contract. An-
other consequence of the personal nature of a private contract is that, 
generally, no one can join the relationship without the consent of all 
the other parties. This feature of personal choice of the other party 
may be blurred at the fringe of the category. For example, histori-
cally, borrowers could choose their lenders and no lender could trans-
fer his rights against the borrower to another person without the 
borrower’s consent. That made sense when the creditor could inflict 
enormous harm on the debtor who failed to pay, such as demanding 
that the debtor be imprisoned. When the rights of the creditor be-
                                                                                                                      
 23. 4 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 856, at 403 (1951) (stating 
that historically, a contract right “was a personal relation that was incapable of delivery”); 
Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and Property 
Law, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389, 402 (1993).  
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came less draconian, limits on the creditor’s right to transfer the debt 
owed to them were relaxed.24  
 Similarly, a claim to personal services is not transferable because 
the personal component of the services is very strong. Yet, on this 
score as well, the rules may be more relaxed. A client of a large law 
firm may insist that a certain lawyer will represent him in court. The 
client is not presumed to object to the brief being prepared by associ-
ates whom he does not know, so long as the associates act under the 
supervision of the lawyer of his choice.  
 While directors and officers of corporations are not entirely pre-
cluded from delegating some of their duties, they may not fully dele-
gate all their responsibilities. In fact, the law prohibits them from 
selling their office or fully delegating their functions.25  
 Private contracts can involve institutions as parties. We buy from 
and sell to corporations. We deposit money in banks and appoint 
banks as trustees. We do not know nor choose the persons with 
whom we deal. Yet, these relationships are limited to the institutions 
of choice. They are as intensely personal or as thinly personal as they 
would be among individuals. Thus, people may be less concerned 
whether they buy the same item from Filene’s or Macy’s in Boston 
but would not be willing to lose their power to choose a trustee bank 
or even the bank as their debtor to deposit their money.  
 Private contracts may involve unknown parties when the con-
tracts entitle such parties to inherit the private contract rights. But 
these unknown contingent parties are fairly easily ascertainable and 
become parties only upon proof of the occurrence of a specific event. 
Therefore, the personal aspect of a private contract is not absolute, 
but it is the starting point of any gap-fillers.  
 Public contracts do not involve fixed specific parties that are iden-
tified in advance. Rather, public contracts are open to individuals 
that share certain characteristics. While in private contract the 
choice is of particular parties, in a public contract the choice of mem-
bership is by the qualifications that the potential members must 
have. These qualifications include, for example, residence or citizen-
ship, qualification for a profession or a trade, holding shares in a cor-
poration, qualifying by age or prestige for a club membership or a 
housing project. The membership could be limited in numbers, but in 
publicly held corporations, for example, the number of members is 
merely limited by the number of shares that the corporation has is-
                                                                                                                      
 24. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 135, at 912-15 (4th ed. 
2001). 
 25. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 11.4.2, at 480-81 (1986) (officer’s 
sale of office); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 4.1.1, at 274-78 (2000) (officer’s 
inattention to subordinates). 
2006]               DEFAULT RULES AND CORPORATIONS 707 
 
sued. Therefore, public contracts are impersonal, even if the number 
of participants is small and even if the participants know each other.  
 In the case of a publicly held corporation, a shareholder who joins 
the group has become a party to the public contract within the corpo-
ration. Entry as a party to this contract does not depend on the choice 
or decision of the other parties but rather on the terms of the entry, 
which are set in advance. To the extent that these terms are binding 
and are not changed, a party can join whether the other parties to 
the public contract like it or not and whether they know who the new 
party is or not. It is not the consent of others, but rather qualifica-
tions that determine membership. Thus, the identity of the parties to 
a public contract is not necessarily known or fixed when the parties 
enter into the relationship or even later on. In this sense, a public 
contract is impersonal.  
B.   Consent Versus Consensus 
 Private and public contracts differ in the type of concurrence that 
binds the parties. To be binding, private contract parties must con-
sent to the terms of the contract and to any changes in these terms.26 
Consent in the private contract sense assumes that the parties were 
free of duress, undue influence, fraud, mistake, and other circum-
stances that would limit the ability of the parties to exercise their 
free will in binding themselves to the terms of the contract. There-
fore, a mistake, incapacity, fraud, and other limitations on free will 
can excuse a party in a private contract from performance.27 
 While private contract requires consent of the contracting parties, 
public contract requires consensus. The difference is similar to the 
difference between signing a private contract and voting in a referen-
dum. If a party to a private contract withholds consent, the contract 
cannot be concluded. In a referendum, a sufficient number of partici-
pants can bind the rest. In addition, parties to a private contract can 
suggest any change and gain the others’ consent. In contrast, mem-
bers to a public contract are more limited in their ability to initiate 
changes in the terms of the contract. Their power to do so depends on 
the provision which authorizes them to initiate or to demand 
changes.28 
                                                                                                                      
 26. Consent is defined as (intransitive verb) “to give assent or approval” and (noun) 
“compliance in or approval of what is done or proposed by another” or “agreement as to ac-
tion or opinion.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 246 (10th ed. 1999). 
 27. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS ch. 8 (5th ed. 
2003) (capacity of parties); id. ch. 9 (misconduct or mistake). 
 28. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a) (granting voters initiative power “to propose 
statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them”); id. § 8(d)-(f) 
(initiative may not concern more than one subject, include or exclude any subdivision from 
its effect based on how it voted, or contain “alternative or cumulative provisions”); id. § 9(a) 
(granting electors referendum power “to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes” ex-
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 In most cases, the parties to a private contract have some contact 
with one other, either directly or through agents. Private contract 
law entitles them to seek information from the other parties to the 
relationship before the contract is executed.29 However, if a party 
seeks information, the other party must disclose the truth, and a con-
tracting party must disclose information it knows the other party is 
relying on.30 If the parties relate through intermediaries, as in the 
case of the securities markets, the law requires that sellers provide 
buyers with information and adopts steps to ensure that the informa-
tion is true. Thus, consent in the private contract sense is based on 
the assumption that each party knows and understands the terms of 
the contract. 
 In contrast, not all persons who are deemed to be members of the 
public contract express their consent to its specific terms. In this type 
of contract, the binding consent is a consensus. In light of the number 
of the parties to a public contract and in order to avoid a stalemate, 
not everyone has the right to veto the terms of the relationship to 
which the majority consented. Thus, a decision by a certain percent-
age of members can bind all members.  
 While consent is a clear expression of an agreement by specified 
parties to all the terms, in the public contract, a consensus is less de-
fined and specific. It denotes a compromise.31 A consensus may exist 
even when the parties do not consent to all the specific terms of the 
relationship but prefer to stay within the relationship rather than 
leave. A consensus has more negative implications than a positive 
consent. It signals that the parties have expressed no strong opposi-
tion to the terms of the public contract rather than that they ex-
pressed a strong commitment to the terms. Years ago the Internet 
community of “techies” adopted a motto that rejected both “kings 
and presidents” as well as voting, emphasizing a consensus instead 
(with respect to technical matters).32 This motto indicates not only 
                                                                                                                      
cept “urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes providing for tax levies or 
appropriations for usual current expenses of the State”); MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII (grant-
ing voters initiative power “to submit constitutional amendments and laws to the people 
for approval or rejection” and referendum power “to submit laws, enacted by the general 
court, to the people for their ratification or rejection”); id. art. XLVIII, § 2 (excluding cer-
tain matters from subject of initiative or referendum petition). 
 29. The nineteenth century doctrine of caveat emptor, that “purchasers buy at their 
own risk,” is still generally valid in transactions between merchants. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 215 (7th ed. 1999); see 7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: 
AVOIDANCE AND REFORMATION § 28.20, at 92 (rev. ed. 2002). 
 30. 7 PERILLO, supra note 29, at 91-92. 
 31. Compromise is defined as “a general agreement,” “the judgment arrived at by most 
of those concerned,” and “group solidarity in sentiment and belief.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 246 (10th ed. 1999). 
 32. Tim Berners-Lee, The World Wide Web and the “Web of Life” (1998), http://www.w3.org/  
People/Berners-Lee/UU.html (“We have no kings or presidents. We believe in rough consensus 
and running code.” (quoting Dave Clark)). 
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the open door to changes but also the open door to participants. 
When the number of participants is unknown or very large and the 
purpose of the group is to expand and to change its terms of commit-
ment, a consensus is more suitable than consent for such a group. 
 Knowledge of the relationship’s terms is important to render the 
parties obligated under a private contract. In contrast, “ignorance of 
the law,” that is, the terms of the public contract, “is no excuse” to 
violation of the law.33 Knowledge of the rules in a public contract is 
not required. Even knowledge of the terms of entry into the group 
may not be necessary for a person to be bound by the group’s rules. 
So long as the parties entered into the group subject to the public 
contract, the applicable public contract terms would apply to them. 
Most parties to the public contract are not the “founding fathers.” 
They join an existing relationship whose terms are fixed and to which 
they may or may not agree. Thus, to be bound by contract requires 
knowledge of the contract terms and freedom to accept an obligation. 
To be bound by a public contract requires no knowledge of the con-
tract terms and affords little freedom to accept the obligation. A child 
is not bound by a private contract yet sometimes benefits from a pub-
lic contract, for example, under tort and inheritance laws.  
C.   Entry and Exit 
 Both private and public contracts are governed by entry and exit 
rules. To enter the relationship, the parties depend on the explicit 
consent of any and all other existing parties. Private contract parties 
cannot withdraw without the consent of the other parties to the con-
tract, except when the contract specifically provides for withdrawal. 
Even death does not allow the parties to terminate many types of 
contracts. Unless the contract requires the active involvement of the 
party that passed away, the duties under such contracts pass to the 
estate of the deceased party.34  
 Entry and exit into the public contract is far more flexible, de-
pending on the qualification of the parties and sometimes on their 
decision to enter or exit. Thus, in most cases entry and exit are not 
dependent on the consent or permission of other existing parties. 
While parties to a private contract cannot enter and leave at will, 
parties to a public contract can enter and leave the relationship far 
more easily, depending on the conditions attached to both entrance 
and exit. For example, in most cases a shareholder is not bound to 
the corporation and can sell his shares, regardless of the consent of 
                                                                                                                      
 33. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 195 (1998) (noting the “traditional 
rule” that “ignorance of the law is no excuse”).  
 34. See PERILLO, supra note 27, § 13.7, at 527. 
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the other shareholders.35 Likewise, a person can leave the state and 
generally cease to be bound by its rules.  
 However, in some instances a public contract can impose condi-
tions on entry and exit that depend on the consent of a select group of 
people. In a condominium association, for example, a number of resi-
dents may have to agree to a new owner. Similarly, in a club, entry 
may depend on the recommendations of two or more members. Entry 
may depend on payment; exit may depend on payment of the debts 
due. Generally, however, the conditions are known in advance and 
are more objective, while in a private contract the conditions may be 
known in advance but depend more on the desires of the member-
ship. A public contract applies to a more transient population, so long 
as the members of the population qualify for entry into the group.  
D.   The Impact on Third Parties 
 The impact of private contract on third parties is fairly limited. 
Those who did not “sign up” are rarely bound by the contract. The 
impact of the public contract on third parties is far greater. Those 
who qualify for membership in a group may be bound by the terms of 
the public contract, whether or not they have agreed to be subject to 
it, and even if they did not know of its existence. Public contracts in-
volve communities, whose members, families and dependents could 
be bound without their will or knowledge.  
E.   Amendment of the Terms of the Relationships 
 The differences between the two types of relationships lead to dif-
ferent ways in which the terms of the relationships are amended. 
Generally, private contract terms change by the explicit consent of 
all parties to the contract.36 The legitimacy of the change is based on 
the parties’ consent. Generally, public contract terms change by the 
consensus of the parties that are parties at the time of the change. 
That date may differ from the original date of the public contract or 
from the date in which new members have joined the relationship.  
Thus, the parties agreeing to the change may not be the original par-
ties to the contract. In public contract, the changes of the terms are 
usually effected either by the representatives of the parties, such as 
                                                                                                                      
 35. See 2 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 
14.09, at 840 (2d ed. 2003) (stating that shares are freely transferable in the absence of re-
strictions). Some countries do not permit waiver of citizenship, viewing the citizens as 
blood members of a family. The United States, in contrast, allows waiver of citizenship. See 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1986) 
(stating that citizenship is a right and that expatriation is a waiver of this right). 
 36. See generally PERILLO, supra note 27, § 5.14, at 242-47 (discussing modification of 
contracts). 
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Congress, or by the votes of a certain percentage of the parties, such 
as the shareholders and voters in a referendum.37  
 A similar distinction applies to changes pursuant to express de-
fault rules. If the law offers a default rule for a private contract, all 
parties to the contract must consent to the deviation from an existing 
contract. In contrast, in the case of a public contract such as the Con-
stitution, if it contains a permissive default rule, Congress can 
change that rule alternately. If a permissive default rule allows for a 
referendum, then the citizens are authorized to change the rule pro-
spectively by another referendum. Most permissive default rules in 
corporate law are of the referendum kind. The representatives of the 
shareholders offer the changes, and the shareholders vote on the 
changes by a consensus.38 In some cases, however, a certain percent-
age of the shareholders may initiate the vote themselves.39 Professor 
Lucian Bebchuk followed a referendum model and suggested a refer-
endum on some governance rules in light of the changes that have 
occurred since the shareholders approved the rules.40  
 The distinctions that are described above stem rationally and 
naturally from the different number of participants and the circum-
stances in which the relationships among the parties arose and are 
going to be terminated. In fact, the distinctions must exist. These 
distinctions lead to different default rules. 
F.   Why Not Call Everything “Contract”? 
 Arguably, there is no need to complicate matters since everything 
can be explained and treated as a contract. After all, even if an inves-
tor in a company’s share did not explicitly agree to the terms of the 
corporate articles, he would likely have agreed to them, had he been 
asked.41 The answer is that names and differences matter a great 
                                                                                                                      
 37. Various forms of referendums can take place.  A referendum vote can depend on a 
first text and invites the parties to approve or disapprove the text. Another form of a refer-
endum allows a certain percentage of the voters to propose a rule and invite the rest of the 
voters to vote on it.  
 38. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (2005) (providing procedure for charter 
amendment; directors must first “adopt a resolution setting forth the amendment pro-
posed,” then either call a special meeting or direct that it be considered at the next annual 
meeting); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 833, 844 (2005). 
 39. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (West, Westlaw through 75 Laws 2006) 
(granting shareholders power to amend bylaws and stating that power may be conferred 
upon directors but shareholders may not be divested of power); see also Bebchuk, supra 
note 38, at 845. However, the bylaws may not be inconsistent with the charter. DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2005); see also Bebchuk, supra note 38, at 845 (“[T]he bylaws . . . are 
subordinate to the charter.”).  
 40. Bebchuk, supra note 38, at 865-75. 
 41. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 
YALE L.J. 698, 702-03 (1982) (“Socially optimal fiduciary rules approximate the bargain 
that investors and agents would strike if they were able to dicker at no cost. [Further, t]o 
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deal. Law is not determined solely by the speculative agreement of 
the parties. It is also organized by categories. Thus, law is divided 
into criminal law, constitutional law, tort, private contract and public 
contract. To be sure, each category is based on the assumption that if 
the parties had been asked, they would have opted for the rules con-
tained in the category. Distinctions between the categories matter. 
Gap-fillers of the Constitution are not the same gap-fillers for child 
custody nor the same as those for private contract. Simplicity is de-
sirable, but treating all categories the same would erase too many 
fundamental details and lead to inappropriate results.  
 Corporate articles and the waiver concern the relationship be-
tween the shareholders and the directors. Directors hold their power 
and discretion in trust. The relationship is not a private contract, al-
though some of it may fall within that category. Yet, a breach of a 
private contract does not carry with it the stigma of a breach of trust. 
A breach of promise is not as pernicious as the misappropriation of 
what is given in confidence. Further, the remedies for a breach of 
promise do not include the remedy of accounting for ill-gotten gains 
but only damages (and restitution, which does not parallel account-
ing for profits).42  
 To be sure, if courts view corporations as private contracts, they 
could achieve the same results as if they viewed corporations as pub-
lic contracts. The court could apply a gap-filling rule to contain a re-
quirement that the directors (and other fiduciaries) account for their 
profits and repay them.43 Such an approach would arguably maintain 
the current fiduciary law rule, but in reality it would not. The source 
of the rules would change. There would be no rule that requires di-
rectors to account for their profits. There would be a gap-filling in-
terpretation of a private contract that would impose this require-
ment; most importantly, the basis for the rule would have changed. 
 A crucial difference between private and public contracts is in the 
view of the parties’ relationship. Private contract is based on prom-
ises, consent, and bargaining. Public contract is based on power and 
                                                                                                                      
say that fiduciary principles require equal (or even fair) treatment is to beg the central 
question—whether investors would contract for equal or even roughly equal treatment.”). 
 42. Restitution under contract is distinguishable from accounting for profit. The pro-
misee’s reliance interest is defined as the recovery that would “attempt to put the promisee 
back in the position in which the promisee would have been had the promise not been 
made.” 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.1, at 77 (3d ed. 2004). “If 
the promisee conferred a benefit on the promisor in the course of the transaction,” the 
promisee’s restitution interest is defined as the recovery that would “attempt to put the 
promisor back in the position in which the promisor would have been had the promise not 
been made.” Id. Courts “have generally declined to require the party in breach to disgorge 
gain resulting from that party’s breach.” Id. § 12.20a, at 338. 
 43. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Re-
sponse to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 29 (1990) (“[F]iduciary duties are 
imposed on parties who have not drafted around them.”). 
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property held in trust for the benefit of others. That is the spirit and 
nature of political and corporate democracy. Under the current cate-
gory, the money and power entrusted to directors never, not even for 
a second, becomes theirs. Private contract subverts this view. If cor-
porate relationships were governed by private contract, then the 
money would be passed to the directors, subject to their promises to 
behave properly. Arguably, property law could also be deemed to be a 
private contract because most people would agree to its rules. Yet we 
do not put them under the same umbrella because the relationships 
are different.  
 In sum, the category of private contract does not fit either the re-
ality of corporate relationships or the law that should be applied to 
people who handle other people’s money. This is especially so with 
respect to rules that apply to corporate directors and officers.  
IV.   COURTS TREAT CORPORATIONS AS PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
 A view of the gap-filling rules tells us that courts do not treat the 
terms of the relationships among directors, officers and shareholders 
as private contracts, but rather as public contracts. Courts limit the 
waiver to the extent allowed in the default rule. Courts look to the 
“legislative history” of the statutory default rule and the corporate 
articles. Such is not their approach to private contracts.  
A.   Gap-Filling Rules for Private and Public Contracts 
 The purpose of gap-fillers in private contracts and public contracts 
is similar. In both cases the interpreter seeks to discover the parties’ 
intent and speculates on how they would have answered the question 
at hand before they entered into the contractual relationship, had 
they been aware of the circumstances that have arisen. But that is 
where the rules applicable to the two types of relationships part 
ways. The reasons are linked to the nature of the relationships. 
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B.   Gap-Filling Rules for Private Contracts 
 Gap-fillers for private contracts derive from the express terms of 
the contract, signaling the motivations and incentives of each party 
and their possible attitude towards the unanswered question that 
arose from their dealings. These gap-fillers could derive from the pre-
sumed parties’ understanding or from the general practice in the par-
ticular area, on the assumption that the parties would have acted as 
many others in the same position would have acted.44 Thus, if the 
situation was not provided for in the private contract and not antici-
pated by the parties, the courts will look to the “omitted term”45 to 
discover the parties’ intention. 
 For the purpose of this discussion, three points are important.  
 (1) In general, when applying gap-filling rules to private con-
tracts, courts do not resort only to the previous negotiations among 
the parties.46 Contracts may be explained or supplemented by the 
course of the parties’ dealing (later performance, after the contract 
was signed).47  
                                                                                                                      
 44. See PERILLO, supra note 27, § 3.13, at 160 (“Express terms have greater weight 
than course of performance, which in turn has greater weight than course of dealing, which 
has greater weight than usage.” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b) 
(1981)). U.C.C. section 2A-207(2) states:  
The express terms of a lease agreement and any course of performance, as well 
as any course of dealing and usage of trade, must be construed whenever rea-
sonable as consistent with each other; but if that construction is unreasonable, 
express terms control course of performance, course of performance controls 
both course of dealing and usage of trade, and course of dealing controls usage 
of trade. 
U.C.C. § 2A-207(2) (2005). 
 45. PERILLO, supra note 27, § 3.14, at 162-63. 
 46. See id. § 3.2, at 124-26 (stating that parol evidence rule provides that a final 
agreement in writing is binding as a contract and supersedes prior negotiations or tenta-
tive agreements). A writing intended as a final agreement may not be contradicted by parol 
evidence. Id. at 126. Both the common law and the U.C.C. take this approach. At common 
law, “course of performance” is usually called “practical construction.” Id. § 3.17, at 169. 
Since course of performance occurs after the contract was signed, the parol evidence rule 
does not prevent it from adding additional terms. Id. If an additional term is so added, “the 
issue is modification or waiver.” The parties’ terms may be explained or supplemented “by 
evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the record to have been in-
tended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.” U.C.C. § 
2-203(h) (2005). 
 47. Under the parol evidence rule, “[A] writing intended by the parties to be a final 
embodiment of their agreement should be protected from certain kinds of evidence.” 
PERILLO, supra note 27, § 3.2, at 124-25. The U.C.C. provides: 
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree 
or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included 
therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a con-
temporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented (a) by 
course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of performance 
(Section 2-208); and (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the 
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 (2) Generally, the interpretation of the text ignores the parties’ dif-
ferent bargaining power,48 except when the process which led to the 
contract was faulty, for example, when a party was induced to enter 
into the agreement by fraud, undue influence or duress.49  
 (3) If neither parol evidence nor canons of construction resolve the 
matter, the courts turn to concepts such as “good faith,” “fairness,” 
and “policy.” 50  
 Thus, in general, gap-filling rules applicable to private contracts 
ignore the parties’ negotiations before they entered into the contract, 
ignore the parties’ disparate bargaining positions, and apply as a last 
resort notions of good faith, fairness, and policy. 
C.   Gap-Filling Rules for Public Contracts 
 In contrast to gap-filling rules for private contracts, in which 
courts do not look to the parties’ negotiation before the contract was 
formed (with the few exceptions mentioned above), in applying gap-
filling rules to public contracts, such as legislation, the reverse seems 
to be the main source of interpretation. Unless the courts determine 
that the text is unambiguous, the interpretation of public contracts 
often draws on the “legislative history.”51 Gap-filling rules are usu-
ally drawn from the opinions of the parties and others expressed in 
legislative hearings and congressional reports before the legislation 
was passed.52 Similarly, in the context of the U.S. Constitution, the 
statements of the Founding Fathers before the adoption of the Con-
stitution are closely examined.  
 If corporate articles were treated as private contracts, the courts 
would refrain from examining any decisions of the directors and any 
materials that were sent to the shareholders before the vote was 
                                                                                                                      
court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive 
statement of the terms of the agreement.  
U.C.C. § 2-202 (2005). Parol evidence is admissible to show defects in contract formation, 
including (a) that the writing was not intended to be operative (i.e., a final agreement); (b) 
the failure of an express condition to occur; (c) fraud; (d) mistake; (e) illegality or uncon-
scionability; and (f) absence of consideration. PERILLO, supra note 27, § 3.7(a)-(f), at 143-48. 
This rule applies to the U.C.C. as well. Id. § 3.7(g), at 148. 
 48. PERILLO, supra note 27, § 3.14, at 163 (stating that in generally determining 
meaning of a disputed term, courts rarely consider relative bargaining power). Even so, the 
party that prepared the text can set up the parameters as a basis for discussion and in 
many cases has more legal talent at its disposal. Therefore, the meaning of the terms is de-
termined against the party that prepared the draft. Id. § 3.31, at 160. 
 49. See discussion supra note 47. 
 50. See PERILLO, supra note 27, § 3.14, at 163. 
 51. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48:03, at 422-
31 (6th ed. 2000) (noting role of preenactment legislative history in statutory interpretation). 
 52. See id. § 48:06, at 440-41 (“Committee Reports represent the most persuasive in-
dicia of congressional intent in enacting a statute.”); see also id. § 48:10, at 453 (“In the 
Federal courts statements of members of the committee or of interested parties at the 
hearing have been considered as aids in determining the legislative intent.”).  
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taken. But if the corporate articles are treated as public contracts, 
the courts may well draw on precisely this source of information. 
 Another relevant distinction between most private and public 
contract situations is that the parties’ representatives in public con-
tract situations, such as elected representatives, usually prepare the 
text presented to the voters. Only in special kinds of referendums do 
voters prepare the text. In most cases the voters can seek a court de-
cision on the exercise of their representatives’ powers, as well as on 
the meaning of the text. This challenge can include attacks on the 
authority of the voters and the state in the context of a referendum.53  
 In the context of public contracts adopted by union members, 
changes are continuously made by the representatives of the union 
members and the management. Hence, litigation in this area focuses 
on the authority of the union representatives. Generally union rep-
resentatives may make changes in the unions’ public contracts, re-
gardless of whether the union members voted on the contracts. That 
is because the union representatives and the management have an 
ongoing relationship in which they can renegotiate the contracts if 
unanticipated events have occurred or the environment has changed. 
 In contrast to union officers, corporate directors do not act as ex-
clusive representatives of the shareholders. Shareholders do not 
have representatives to negotiate on their behalf with the directors 
or with management. The waivers are not negotiated, but rather 
presented to shareholders on a “take it or leave it” basis, and there 
are no mechanisms to review the waiver in light of new circum-
stances.  
D.   Courts Interpret the Default Rule Concerning Corporate Directors’ 
Duty of Care and the Corporate Articles as They Interpret Public 
Contracts 
 Corporate articles that contain a waiver have opted out of the cor-
porate statutes’ rules. The authority for the waiver is derived from 
the default rule in the corporate statute. Had the corporate laws been 
silent about the directors’ duty of care, the common law rule would 
have applied and imposed a duty of care on directors. It is unclear 
whether and to what extent the common law duty of care is a default 
rule. In any event, state legislatures had previously restated the 
common law rule in the statutes as an unconditional rule. Only later 
did legislatures change the rule into a default rule that allowed them 
to contract out of the common law. 54 
                                                                                                                      
 53. See, e.g., Albano v. Attorney Gen., 769 N.E.2d 1242 (Mass. 2002) (determining whether 
petitioners have authority under state constitution to add provision defining marriage). 
 54. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1210-
11 (1995). 
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 When shareholders amend corporate articles to adopt waivers, the 
courts interpret the waivers as they interpret public contracts. 
Courts focus on the permissive default rules that allow the waiver 
and on the limitations that the rules impose. Then courts examine 
the facts of the cases to determine whether the directors’ behavior of 
which the shareholders complain falls within or outside the default 
rules and corporate articles,55 that is, whether the waiver shelters the 
directors.  
 The “legislative history,” so to speak, of the corporate articles 
could draw on the intent of the management and the shareholders, as 
articulated in the proxy statements, the shareholders’ reports and 
other corporate documents, and perhaps in shareholders’ opinions. 
Indeed, there are cases in which the plaintiffs sought a court deter-
mination of whether the disclosure to the voting shareholders was 
truthful or misleading under the securities laws.56 These decisions 
parallel the attack on the integrity of the voting process, and were 
limited to the truth of the disclosed information. If the process was 
not contaminated by misleading statements, the courts did not go 
any further. They did not interpret the corporate articles in light of 
the true information that the voters received and did not limit the 
permissible range of the waiver in the default rules and the corporate 
articles to the actual facts on which the voters relied when they voted 
to amend the corporate articles. So long as the facts were true, the 
facts did not provide the boundary to the permissible waiver.57 
 Thus, in general, while courts will not allow evidence of the par-
ties’ negotiations before the private contract was signed,58 they will 
resort to “legislative history” before the public contract was passed.59 
The public contract gap-filling rule focuses on what the parties would 
have said had they been asked or had they faced the situation at 
hand.60 The legislative gap-filling rule focuses on the problems that 
led to the legislation and the information that led to the solutions.61   
                                                                                                                      
 55. See JENNIFER L. BERGER ET AL., 3A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1047, at 87-88 (perm. ed., rev. 2002). “If corporate directors 
breach the duty of care intentionally, knowingly, or in bad faith, director protection stat-
utes will not shield them from personal liability.” Id. § 1047 (Supp. 1995); KNEPPER & 
BAILEY, supra note 9, at ch. 16; DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 226-42 (5th ed. 1998).  
 56. See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 85 (Del. 1992). 
 57. See id. at 84-88. 
 58. PERILLO, supra note 27, § 3.2, at 124 (“[I]n determining the content of the con-
tract, earlier tentative agreements and negotiations are inoperative.”).  
 59. See 2A SINGER, supra note 51, § 48:03, at 422-31. 
 60. PERILLO, supra note 27, § 3.13, at 158. 
 61. See 2A SINGER, supra note 51, § 48:01, at 408-09 (“Extrinsic aids consist of back-
ground information about circumstances which led to the enactment of a statute, events 
surrounding enactment, and developments pertinent to subsequent operation.”). 
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 The reason for this distinction relates to the process by which the 
two kinds of relationships—private contracts and public contracts—
are established. Private contract parties can start negotiations on 
one deal and end up with another. They are less bound by a pre-
determined process than public contract parties, and the history of 
their negotiation provides a less reliable source of evidence about 
their intentions than the legislative history of a public contract. The 
legislative history of corporate articles’ waiver is procedurally similar 
to that of legislation and perhaps even more focused than legislation. 
That is because the waivers involve not merely conflict of interest 
transactions, but the remedy which shareholders could claim for 
breach of fiduciary duties. In that respect, the waivers are similar to 
union public contracts. 
V.   LESSONS FROM DEFAULT AND GAP-FILLING RULES ABOUT THE 
NATURE OF THE CORPORATION AND DIRECTORS’ LIABILITIES 
 Default rules and gap-fillers can signal the type of relationships to 
which the rules apply. For example, the U.C.C. allows parties to de-
sign their entire relationship for themselves, regardless of the 
U.C.C.’s provisions. In contrast, rules concerning a directors’ duty of 
care allow the corporate articles to provide the directors with a 
waiver only within limited parameters. This difference is reflected in 
the judicial gap-filling rules. 
 When the parties depart from the U.C.C.’s provision, the courts 
focus on the parties’ agreement and use gap-filling rules to which 
they resort in interpreting private contracts. That is because courts 
classify the parties’ relationship to which the Code applies as a con-
tract relationship. In contrast, when corporations adopt waivers in 
the corporate articles, the gap-filling rules applied by the courts are 
similar to the rules applied to public contracts (legislation). Courts 
apply these rules both to the corporate statutes and indirectly to the 
corporate articles that were amended to include the waiver. Courts 
focus on the statutes and the limits they impose and examine the 
truth of the proxy information that the voters received but do not 
limit the scope of the waiver to that information.62 In this last exami-
nation, courts seem to determine whether the voters received truth-
ful information. The inquiry, however, stops at truth of information. 
The information that the voters received is not factored into the gap-
filling rule to determine the scope of the waivers.  
 The differences between gap-filling rules in private and public 
contract tell us about the differences between the relationships to 
which these rules apply, including the identity of those who produced 
                                                                                                                      
 62. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 94-98 (Del. 2001). 
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the text and the process by which the text was produced. This in-
quiry can thus lead to a description of the relationship among the 
parties to a corporation.  
A.   Corporations Have Evolved into Public Contracts 
 Daniel Boorstin describes the evolution of the groups that crossed 
the country and settled the American West.63 At first, small groups 
attempted to cross on their own. They did not survive. They were 
killed by wild beasts and warring Indians. For self-protection, they 
formed larger groups. But members of the groups were unruly and 
posed dangers to each other. To protect themselves from each other, 
the groups formed a government. They chose a leader and estab-
lished a constitution and a jury. They purchased their food and ne-
cessities together to gain economies of scale. The enforcement of the 
rules was brutal. Serious violators were discarded and left to die. The 
groups were open both ways. People could join and leave, for exam-
ple, when they found land that they liked and decided to settle. Upon 
reaching their destinations on the West Coast, the groups dissolved.  
 Corporations of today share many of the features of the groups 
that crossed to the West. Both their members and today’s corpora-
tions’ shareholders share economic and business purposes. The 
members of the West Coast groups committed to behave and share in 
servicing their communities. The members of today’s corporations 
commit their money to the corporation.  
 More importantly, the constitutions and rules of both groups rep-
resent public, not private contracts. Today’s shareholders vote on 
their corporate articles in a manner similar to the West Coast 
groups’ referendum model. In both cases, the voters decide on rules 
that are proposed by their boards, leaders, or representatives. Both 
groups make their decisions by consensus rather than the consent of 
each member. Membership in both groups is subject to qualifications 
but is open rather than subject to the consent of the other members. 
In both groups members can leave freely, subject to rules that apply 
to all members. Thus, the West Coast groups and today’s corpora-
tions are governed by public, and not by private contracts. 
B.   Public Contracts Waiving Fiduciary Duties 
 Those who entrust their money to fiduciaries (entrustors) have a 
right to rely on the fiduciaries to act for the entrustors’ benefit.64 In 
fiduciary relationships that are personal among identified parties, 
                                                                                                                      
 63. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 49-90 (1965). 
 64. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 824-25 (1983) (citing Vai v. 
Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 364 P.2d 247, 252-53 (Cal. 1961)).  
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the fiduciaries who seek gain from their control of the entrustors’ 
money or entrusted power must seek the entrustors’ consent, after 
informing the entrustors fully about the transaction, so that the en-
trustors can be put in an arm’s length relationship with the fiduciar-
ies.65 The same principle applies to public contracts that involve fidu-
ciary relationships. In a public contract environment, all parties 
must receive the information, so that a consensus rather than con-
sent will be reached. The burden of providing the information in the 
corporate context is placed on the corporation managed by its fiduci-
aries.66 The relevant information is harder to gain in this case and 
investors’ ability to exit the corporation by selling their shares is 
generally greater and less expensive as compared to their place of 
residence and citizenship in the political arena. In political public 
contracts, the information is generally provided by a constitutionally 
protected “market place of ideas.”67  
 Under fiduciary law, the entrustors’ permission for fiduciaries to 
benefit from the fiduciary relationship is meaningful only if the en-
trustors have full information about the benefits and the conse-
quences of the waivers to the fiduciaries. That information is usually 
linked to a particular transaction. General waivers do not offer the 
entrustors adequate information about the waivers’ possible conse-
quences for them. Therefore, such waivers are not sufficient to re-
lieve the fiduciaries of their duties to abstain from benefiting.68 If an 
entrustor does not know how much he could lose from future con-
flicted transactions, how can he give an informed consent? How can 
the group of voters in the corporation reach an informed consensus? 
In fact, under the Uniform Trusts Act the consent to conflict of inter-
est transactions is recognized only after the trustee has violated the 
law.69 In such cases the entrustors can precisely calculate their 
losses, if any, from the fiduciary’s transaction. In other cases the re-
quired information covers specific transactions, even if they did not 
occur. The same requirement of specificity applies in public contracts 
that involve fiduciary relationships. For example, the Supreme Court 
held that the publisher of an investment advisory newsletter is a fi-
                                                                                                                      
 65. Id. at 826 (citing 2 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 173 (3d ed. 1967) and 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 cmt. c (1957)). 
 66. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
 67. The source of information is more diffuse and the ability of the citizens to leave 
their country or residence is far more costly. 
 68. Frankel, supra note 64, at 821. 
 69. Uniform Trusts Act § 18, 7C U.L.A. 466 (2000) (allowing a beneficiary of “full legal 
capacity and acting upon full information” to relieve a trustee of any duties other than 
those imposed by sections 3, 4, and 5); id. § 3, at 446 (prohibiting loan of trust funds to self 
or certain affiliated or related parties); id. § 4, at 447 (allowing corporate trustee to deposit 
funds with self under some circumstances); id. § 5, at 448 (prohibiting buying or selling of 
trust property to or from self or certain affiliated or related parties). 
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duciary of the subscribers and must disclose to them his possible con-
flicts of interest.70  
 I noted that courts examine the truth of the information that the 
shareholders received before they voted on the corporate articles. The 
disclosure requirement and its accuracy only partly reflect the rules 
of fiduciary law. That is because the current gap-filling rules relating 
to the corporate articles recognize a general waiver of the directors’ 
duty of care, limited by the interpretation of the permissive default 
rule. Thus, the gap-filling rules are related to the text of the default 
rules or to the truth of the disclosure, but not to the specific transac-
tions to which the waiver would attach. I argue that the current gap-
filling rules have not gone far enough, and that the limitations on 
waivers should be tightened. As mentioned, gap-fillers are judicial 
speculation on the intent of the parties. How, then, should gap-filling 
rules be fashioned in this context? 
VI.   IS THE GAP-FILLING RULE APPLIED BY THE COURTS THE OPTIMAL 
RULE FOR THE CORPORATE ARTICLES THAT CONTAIN THE WAIVER?  
 In fashioning gap-filler rules, both the text and the legislative his-
tory play a role. If the text and the legislative history relate to each 
other and if the text has boundaries and is specific, the legislative 
history should relate to the boundaries and specific text.  
 A waiver of fiduciary duties, just as the waiver of any entitlement, 
whether quantified or not, requires a specific description of the cir-
cumstances in which such a waiver would apply. Voters are not pre-
scient. Even if they receive true information of today’s reality and the 
purpose of the waiver, they do not know how much the waiver will 
cost them in other circumstances in the future.  
 Like all judicial gap-fillers, courts attempt to foresee the voters’ 
expectations. In the case of waiver of fiduciary duties, however, the 
legislative history can clarify the voters’ understanding, intentions, 
and expectations. The voters received and are likely to have based 
their vote on the legislative history of waivers and the current infor-
mation.  
 Therefore, I conclude that courts should further limit the scope of 
waivers to the information and reasons that the shareholders re-
ceived before they voted to approve the waivers and to the circum-
stances in which the waivers were granted. If the circumstances sur-
rounding the voting have changed materially, the directors should 
renew and refresh the effect of the waiver by seeking the sharehold-
                                                                                                                      
 70. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195-201 (1963) (requiring 
the adviser to disclose that he holds the stock that he recommends and will sell the stock 
shortly after the market will rise, presumably on the basis of his recommendation—a  
practice called “scalping”). 
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ers’ votes after disclosing to the shareholders information about the 
new environment. If courts signal such a requirement, the directors 
of most corporations may have an incentive to do so on a regular ba-
sis. The directors, the shareholders, and the courts would benefit 
from clearer and more predictable rules in this area. 
VII.   CONCLUSION: A BETTER AND MORE PRECISE GAP-FILLING RULE 
A.   If the Corporate Articles Represent a Public Contract and if the 
Articles Contain Waivers of Fiduciary Duties, How Should the Courts 
Interpret These Waivers? 
 Because the corporate articles are public contracts, they can be 
binding by a consensus, provided the articles were enacted in compli-
ance with the required process and did not exceed the boundaries al-
lowed by corporate law. Judicial interpretation of the corporate de-
fault rule and its limits would continue—as they do—in interpreting 
other public contracts. In these cases they resort to the legislative 
history of the corporate law. Yet, in these cases the legislative history 
of the corporate articles should play a part as well. 
 How should the waiver be treated in such a case? One answer is to 
render the corporate articles on the waiver to the situation that led 
to the default rule, that is, the situation in Smith v. Van Gorkom.71 In 
such a case the waiver would not apply to many of the situations that 
arose in the 1990s and that might persist even today. This gap-filling 
rule, however, would not allow corporations and their shareholders to 
move from that fixed environment at the time in which the share-
holders voted on the corporate articles. And yet, there is little in the 
legislative history of the corporate default rule to suggest that courts 
would be bound to such a rigid interpretation. On the other hand, it 
is unclear that legislatures intended to eliminate the fundamental 
principles of fiduciary law, even though the legislatures set limita-
tions on the scope of permissible waivers.  
 To allow for some flexibility for both directors and shareholders, 
gap-filling rules should permit changes in the scope of the waivers, 
as well as provide directors with incentives to seek the shareholders’ 
votes for such changes. This principle suggests an interpretation that 
combines the rules of fiduciary law with the limits of the legislatures’ 
default rule.  
 But how can the corporate articles be narrowed? Should the courts 
look to the environment at the time of the adoption of the articles? 
Not necessarily. When the corporate articles contain a waiver, the 
waiver should be limited to the circumstances that existed when the 
shareholders voted for the waiver. The duty of care as stated in the 
                                                                                                                      
 71. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
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corporate statutes would continue to apply in those circumstances 
that are not covered by the corporate articles.  
B.   Public Contracts Involving Direct Impact on the Voters 
 One purpose of gap-filling rules is to reduce uncertainty for the 
parties. Uncertainty—at least in the case of corporate articles that 
contain the waiver—could be greatly reduced if the full legislative 
history of the corporate article would be considered and followed as a 
guide. This principle is especially important in the case of the waiver. 
 When public contracts involve a more direct impact on the voters 
and more specific subject matter, the public contract requires a refer-
endum. It is not surprising that in some states taxation is subject to 
a referendum. It should not be surprising if public contracts that con-
tain a waiver of fiduciary duties of corporate management should re-
quire a detailed “legislative history.” In such cases shareholders 
should vote not only on principles of waiving their rights against im-
prudent or careless directors but also on the specific situations in 
which the directors behaved carelessly. It is only when the specific 
situations are outlined that the voters would know what they are 
waiving. 
 The legislative history of corporate articles during the Van 
Gorkom era is different from the legislative history during the Enron 
era. Shareholders may be ready to forgo the directors’ carelessness in 
a case such as Van Gorkom, but not in a case such as Enron.72 When 
they vote in circumstances like Van Gorkom and they had no infor-
mation about a situation such as Enron, they should not be assumed 
to have voted for a waiver that would cover directors in an Enron-
type situation.  
 The legislative history of waivers is contained in the materials 
that the voting shareholders received before they voted, such as the 
proxy materials, which solicit the proxies for the vote on this subject. 
These materials should state with an acceptable degree of specificity 
the situations that the waiver would cover.  
 But would this rule increase uncertainty? The managers might 
not know before the fact where the line would be drawn between is-
sues subject to the waiver and those that are not. The answer is: the 
most specific waivers are those that are granted after the fact. Then 
shareholders can evaluate the directors’ actions and failures to act, 
and can then approve an informed waiver. If the corporate statutes 
allow the corporation to opt out of the statute and establish a stricter 
duty of care, chances are that the directors will not call upon the 
                                                                                                                      
    72.  In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. 
Tex. 2003). 
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shareholders to take advantage of such a default rule to reduce the 
directors’ protection from liability. But if the corporate articles con-
tain waivers, which may not sufficiently cover situations that the di-
rectors desire to be covered, then directors will have great incentives 
to bring the issues back to the shareholders for review and re-
iteration. 
 Because the management will have an incentive to limit the 
remedies for its breach of fiduciary duty of care, management could 
offer an amendment whenever the shareholders are asked to vote for 
the directors or for other matters. The scope of such a later approval 
will depend on the general interpretation of the statutory default rule 
as well as on the materials that the shareholders received before they 
voted the previous time, when they approved the corporate articles. 
The more often and the more specific the shareholders’ approval of 
the waiver is, the more informed the shareholders would be, and the 
stronger the waiver should hold. The process is likely to result in 
more uniform judicial gap-filling rules. The information that the 
shareholders receive before approving the corporate articles contain-
ing the waivers can guide the courts in determining the scope of the 
waivers. This development, in turn, could provide more certainty and 
predictability for both shareholders and their directors. It will meet 
the need for protecting directors as well as for protecting sharehold-
ers, and it will allow courts sufficient flexibility to determine whether 
or not directors should be subject to less threatening damages. 
